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Abstract
This paper is on the construction of a server subsystem in a client/server system in an application context where
the number of potential clients can be arbitrarily large. The implementation of the server is based on the well-known
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) technique. The three server processes must process the client inputs in the same
order to keep the server state consistent.
While a client can fail by crashing and at least two server processes behave correctly, the third server process can
behave in an arbitrary way. Moreover, the communication between clients and server processes is assumed reliable
and the network can deliver the same client input to any two server processes within a known bounded time (D). There
is also a known bound on the communication delay between every pair of correct server processes (d).
In order to cope with client crash and server process failure, it is assumed that if a client input is deposited in the
local memory of a server process at time t, then it is systematically discarded from this local memory at time t+ if
it still remains unordered (this bound additionally manages process’ memory requirements).
The problem addressed in the paper is new and consists of designing protocols that allow the correct server pro-
cesses to order client inputs identically despite the combined effect of the bound , the behavior of the Byzantine
server process, and the client crash failures. The paper presents two results. It first introduces an ordering protocol
that works 8  > D + 3d. Then it shows that there is no ordering protocol when  < D.
1 Introduction
Context of the study Many distributed applications and systems are structured according to the well known clien-
t/server paradigm. A service is implemented by a server subsystem and a client issues input requests to a server and
waits for an answer (if any). This simple RPC-like type of invocation allows geographically dispersed clients to re-
motely access a service to which they are connected through a network. A server subsystem is implemented by a set
of replicated server processes. We assume that the network is reliable; when the network delivers the same client input
to any two server processes, the difference between the delivery times is assumed to be bounded by D. Moreover, the
transfer delay of any message exchanged by two correct server processes is bounded by d.
This paper addresses the design of such servers in a context where clients and server processes can experience
failures. A client can crash while issuing a request. A server is implemented by three processes according to the Triple
Modular Redundancy technique (TMR). As far as server processes are concerned, at least two server processes behave
correctly, and the faulty one can exhibit a Byzantine behavior. In order to keep the service state consistent, the correct
processes of a server have to cooperate to process the client inputs in the same order.
The problem of server design is also studied in the application context where the number of clients which have
access to the server is arbitrarily large. We motivate such an application context by drawing examples from the
domain of e-commerce. The eBay auction house is said to have more than 12 million registered users or clients who
could access its server for placing bids [3]. Other e-business houses, such as CNET [1], Priceline [9], and E*Trade [4],
claim to have a similar number of users registered with them as potential clients. A large number of potential clients
has two implications for the server design. First, the input rate to the server is usually large (eBay claims to process up
to 300 bids per minute). A server outage even for a short duration or provision of incorrect services even occasionally
is highly undesirable. Given that server nodes are often built with commercial off the shelf (cots) components and
operating systems, it is not prudent to assume only benign failure modes for server processes [5, 15]. Therefore,
admitting Byzantine failure modes and employing triple modular redundancy appear to be design requirements rather
than design options. Secondly, every input should be subject to verification before processing, and this involves
accessing client-related data (such as authentication keys, input history, client privileges, credit limits, etc.). Owing to
a large number of potential clients, this client-related data will be large and have to be stored in a disk. Our emphasis
here is not on the exact semantics of input verification, but to observe that input verification requires disk access and
can be time consuming.
Motivation and content of the paper As noted earlier, correct replicas within a TMR server must process inputs in
the same order. Let p
i
, p
j
and p
k
be three replicas. Say, p
k
receives an input  from a client. If p
k
is correct, it should
verify ; if  is found to be a valid input, p
k
should then construct message m
k
() that contains  and broadcast
m
k
() to other servers for identical ordering (we call this “p
k
forwarding  to its peers”). This ordering is typically
achieved by Atomic Broadcast protocols [2, 6, 13]. Say, a correct p
i
makes an ordered delivery of m
k
(); it should
not process the contained input straightaway unless  is locally verified, since the forwarding process may be faulty:
p
k
may not have verified  properly or, even worse, may be replaying an old input as a newly received input or may
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have invented  on behalf of the client. (Note that p
i
will find an invented input to be invalid if it verifies  locally.)
There are three options for p
i
to verify the  in m
k
().
 (i) Verify the forwarded input: p
i
accesses the client data from the local database and verifies  encapsulated
in m
k
() [14]. As observed earlier, input verification requires disk access and is a time-consuming procedure.
Suppose that (1) p
k
is faulty, (2)  is a replayed or invented input, and (3) while  is being verified, p
i
delivers
its own m0(0) which it sent after having received (different) 0 from another client and verified it. To ensure
identically ordered input processing, p
i
must postpone processing of 0 until  is found to be an input that
requires no processing. Thus, in this approach, a faulty p
k
can force a correct p
i
to perform input verification
unnecessarily for every input it replays or invents and thereby slow down the server performance. That is, node
performance is vulnerable to malicious failures. Moreover, even when all replicas are correct, p
i
will deliver
two ordering messages (forwarded by its peers) for a given input; each message can initiate the verification of
the same, contained input. This redundant verification, necessary to avoid processing the same input more than
once, can spell a considerable performance overhead, particularly when the input rate is high.
 (ii) Await direct reception: p
i
waits for the local host to receive  directly from the client and verify it. However,
if the client had crashed while sending  or if  is a replayed or invented input, direct reception by p
i
is not
possible.
 (iii) Verify through matching: p
i
waits for the ordered delivery of anotherm() constructed either by itself or by
p
j
for the same . Delivery of a matching m() indicates that two distinct replicas have directly received  and
verified it, and at least one of them is correct. So, even if the matching m() has not been formed by p
i
itself, p
i
can accept  for processing without verifying it locally. On the other hand, if m
k
() is a replayed/invented input
or if  has been sent only to p
k
due to client crash, m
k
() will remain unmatched but will not cause unwarranted
input verification by p
i
. Note that the (ordered) delivery of a matching message initiates the (ordered) processing
of the matched input; therefore, an input that has been forwarded earlier and remains unmatched cannot delay
the processing of a matched input.
In this paper, we will focus on the last approach of input matching due to its resilience to replayed and invented
inputs forwarded by a faulty server. Note that this approach subsumes the second approach when the matching m()
has been constructed by p
i
itself. Let us also note that (like the second approach) it requires a time bound so that
waiting for the delivery of a matching message (or for the reception the expected input in the second approach) can
be terminated if m
k
() is an input replayed or invented by p
k
or if the client has crashed while sending the input only
to p
k
. Therefore, we introduce a duration bound (denoted ) as an essential requirement: an ordering message (that
forwards a client input) is systematically discarded from the a server process address space within at most  time after
it has been received or formed. Note that, without this requirement, server processes should have an infinite memory:
in fact, a faulty server process could invent infinitely many inputs and forward them to its peers. Such inputs would
never match with another input and thus, without a time requirement, would never be discarded. So, our problem
is concerned with designing an Atomic Broadcast protocol that works despite the combined effects of the bounded
lifetime , a Byzantine server process, and the client crash failures. These constraints (which come from practical
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considerations that aim at providing server processes with bounded storage [14]) actually define a problem that we call
-constrained Atomic Broadcast. This problem is new. It is solved by what we call -ordering protocols. The paper
is on these protocols. It presents two results. It first introduces a -ordering protocol that works for any value of ,
provided  > D + 3d. Then it shows an impossibility result, namely, there is no -ordering protocol when  < D.
Interestingly, the “uncertainty” value 3d is a parameter that depends only on the performances of the TMR subsystem.
Paper organization The paper is made up of six sections. Section 2 introduces the system model. Section 3
presents the problem we are interested in. Then, Section 4 describes the -ordering protocol, while Section 5 proves
the impossibility result. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 System Model
2.1 Structure of the System
As announced in the Introduction, we consider a client/server system model. Such a system is made up of an
arbitrarily large number of clients that access a finite set of servers. A client can access one server at a time. As the
problem we are interested in concerns the implementation of servers, without loss of generality, we consider there is a
single server in the system.
A client requires the service by directly requesting the server. A client that wishes to access the server issues an
input request (in short input) and possibly waits for an answer. Each client input is unique. Then, the server processes
the client input and sends it back the result (if any). The server module is implemented by using a TMR approach
(Triple Modular Redundancy): it is made up of three server processes, namely, p
1
, p
2
and p
3
, and each server process
processes each input.
Each client and the three server processes communicate by exchanging messages through communication channels.
When a client issues an input, it sends a message to each server process (in short process in the following). If there is
a result, it waits for an identical answer from two processes (details can be seen in [14].).
The three processes can communicate with each other by exchanging messages. There is a communication channel
connecting each pair of processes. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that the processes have read access to
the same reliable clock, called the TMR clock (or equivalently, they have perfectly synchronized clocks1). The general
structure of the system we consider is depicted in Figure 1.
2.2 Failure Model
Communication is reliable. This means that the underlying communication network delivers every sent message
to correct destination(s). Further, it neither alters, duplicates nor creates messages between any client/process or
process/process pair.
In this paper, we consider that a client can fail only by crashing. When it crashes, it stops its execution and never
recovers. This means that if a client crashes while it is issuing an input to the processes, this input may be received by
1Protocols that synchronize local clocks despite bounded drift do exist, e.g., [16, 17].
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Figure 1. Structure of the System (with 4 Clients)
none, one, two or the three processes. A client behaves correctly until it possibly crashes.
Among the three processes, at most one of them can be faulty. Moreover, it can fail by exhibiting an arbitrary (i.e.,
Byzantine or malicious) behavior [10]. Each process signs the messages it sends to other processes, and authenticates
the messages it receives from them.
As in Section 4 of [8], it is assumed that the faulty process cannot undetectably forge a correct process signature for
any given message, nor undetectably alter the contents of a message that is already signed by a correct process [12].
This means that the protocol we present is built on top of an underlying “authenticated messages” model.
2.3 Timing Assumptions
The client/server system is characterized by two time bounds. The first timing assumption is:
 Let  be a client input delivered by the network to two processes at TMR times t
1
and t
2
, respectively. We have:
jt
1
  t
2
j  D.
Note that if one of the processes is faulty, it may fail to receive the message delivered to it, or arbitrarily delay the
reception. For simplicity, we assume that a correct process delivers a message as soon as it is received form the
underlying network delivered by the network (this assumption does not require bound on message delays between
clients and server processes). The realization of D is discussed in Section 5.3.
The second timing assumption concerns the channels connecting the three processes within the TMR subsystem:
 If, at any time t, a correct process p
i
sends a message to another correct process p
j
, then p
j
receives it at most
at t+ d.
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3 The Problem
3.1 Ordering the Inputs from Clients
The correct processes must have mutually consistent copies of the state of the service they implement. This can be
obtained by requiring correct processes to order the client inputs in the same way before processing them according to
this order [13]. This well-known problem is the Atomic Broadcast problem defined by the following set of properties2
[6]:
 AB-Validity. An input issued by a correct client is ordered by each correct process.
 AB-Integrity. Any input ordered by a correct process comes from a client. Moreover, any input is ordered at
most once by a correct process.
 AB-Agreement. If an input  is ordered by a correct process, then it is ordered by each correct process.
 AB-Order. If two correct processes p
i
and p
j
order two inputs 
1
and 
2
, then p
i
orders 
1
before 
2
if and
only if p
i
orders 
1
before 
2
.
This problem is solved by an ordering protocol.
3.2 -Ordering Protocols
The Family of -Ordering Protocols For a process and a client input , let the lifetime of  be the time duration
during which this process has to keep it in its local memory for the needs of the ordering protocol. From a practical
point of view, the bounded lifetime of ordering messages is an important requirement for the administrator in allocating
the memory space for server processes, given that the number of inputs that are simultaneously waiting to be ordered
can be quite large3. Without a guaranteed bound on the lifetimes of ordering messages, memory overflow can lead to
crash of the server process or even the host node.
Let us define a -constrained TMR subsystem, as a TMR subsystem where, for any process p
i
, every ordering
message (used to forward a client input) is systematically discarded from p
i
’s local memory  time units after p
i
received it ( being an a priori predefined bound). Moreover, let the family of -ordering protocols be the set of all
the protocols that implement the input ordering specifications given in the previous section, in a -constrained TMR
subsystem. As announced in the Introduction, the paper studies this family of protocols: it presents a -ordering
protocol that works for any value of  such that  > D + 3d. Then, it shows that there is no -ordering protocol
when  < D.
Assumptions on -Ordering Protocols Let us first remark that, whatever be the design of a -ordering protocol,
each input issued by a client is received by none, one, two or the three processes of the TMR subsystem (this depends
2Here we express this problem in terms of “input ordering” instead of “message delivery”.
3Assuming that the size of the inputs is bounded and their arrival rate is also bounded.
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only on the correctness of the client while it is issuing the input). Then, the dissemination of copies of a client input
among the processes depends on the protocol.
As far as the copies of a client input is concerned, a -ordering protocol has the following three characteristics:
 A -ordering protocol may force a process receiving an input (either directly from the client or from another
process) to forward this input to none, one or the two other processes. This is the forwarding policy associated
with the protocol.
As a consequence of (1) this policy, (2) the client correctness, and (3) the correctness of the forwarding process,
a process can have, at a given time, zero, one or more copies of a client input.
 When a -ordering protocol requires a process to forward a client input it has received, it can permit some delay
 (  ) to elapse between the reception of that input and its forwarding. This is the delay policy of the
protocol.
 The last feature of a -ordering protocol concerns the number of input copies that a process must simultaneously
have for ordering that input. This is the decision policy of the protocol.
It is assumed that these policies are mutually consistent (This is the “Policy Consistency” assumption). This means
that if, for example, the decision policy stipulates that two input copies must be present, then the forwarding policy
allows for such a decision.
Finally, as the process that can exhibit Byzantine behavior is not known a priori, it is not possible to associate a
particular behavior with each process, separately. So, a -ordering protocol is assumed to be symmetric, in the sense
that the correct processes run the same program (except for process identities and signatures).
4 A -Ordering Protocol
This section presents a -ordering protocol that, when  > D + 3d, allows the correct processes of the TMR
subsystem to correctly order the client inputs despite the bound , the possible existence of a Byzantine process, and
the clients’ crash failures. This protocol assumes that every correct process of the TMR subsystem is able to decide
whether an input directly received from a client is valid or not. This can be done through verification mechanisms
accessing client-related data such as authentication keys, input history, client privileges, credit limits, etc.
4.1 An Underlying Building Block
The protocol is built on top of an underlying Timed Atomic Broadcast protocol executed by the server processes.
Such a protocol allows processes to broadcast and deliver messages according to the following specification [2, 6]:
 TAB-Validity. If a correct process broadcasts a message m, then it eventually delivers m.
 TAB-Integrity. For any message m, every correct process delivers m at most once, and only if it has been
broadcast by a process.
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 TAB-Agreement. If a correct process delivers a message m, then each correct process delivers m.
 TAB-Order. If two correct processes p
i
and p
j
deliver m and m0, then p
i
delivers m before m0 if and only if p
j
delivers m before m0.
 TAB-Timeliness. There is a known constant  such that if a message m is broadcast at time t, then no correct
process delivers m after time t+.
Let TAB-broadcast and TAB-deliver be the two primitives offered by a Timed Atomic Broadcast protocol. As usu-
al, When a process invokes TAB-broadcast(m) we say it “TAB-broadcasts m”. Similarly, when a process terminates
the execution of TAB-deliver(m) we say it “TAB-delivers m” (or “m is TAB-delivered to it”).
Timed Atomic Broadcast can be implemented in the TMR subsystem described in Section 2.1. Moreover, in this
context (three processes, at most one faulty process, signatures, perfectly synchronized clocks and upper bound d on
message transfer delays), a Timed Atomic Broadcast protocol provides  = 2d.
The protocol defined by Cristian et al. [2] (called here CASD from its authors names) implements the Timed
Atomic Broadcast problem. It additionally provides the following property, that we call CASD-Del Time. Let m
1
and m
2
be two messages TAB-broadcast by correct processes p
i
and p
j
at real-time t
1
and t
2
, and TAB-delivered by
a correct process at real-time T
1
and T
2
, respectively. Moreover, let (t
1
 t
2
)  ((t
1
< t
2
) _ (t
1
= t
2
^ i < j)).
CASD-Del Time states that if t
1
 t
2
, then we have T
1
< T
2
. In the following, we assume that this property is
provided by the TAB-broadcast protocol used within the TMR subsystem.
The message signatures are used within the TAB-broadcast protocol to allow a receiver process to authenticate the
messages it receives (see [2]). They are not directly used by the -ordering protocol we are designing.
4.2 The protocol
The -ordering protocol built on top of the timed atomic broadcast protocol is based on the following policies (see
Section 3.2):
Forwarding policy. A process receiving an input directly from a client TAB-broadcasts a control message m (con-
taining the client input and control information as explained below), if the received input is verified to be valid.
Delay policy. For the sake of exposition, we assume  = 0 (this means that the TAB-Broadcast is immediate when
an input from a client arrives at a process).
Decision policy. A process orders a client input as soon as it has TAB-delivered two (authenticated) copies of it from
distinct processes.
The principles of the protocol are as follows. When a process p
i
receives a valid input  directly from a client, it
makes up a message m that contains the received input ( is put in the field m:input), the input reception time (m:ts),
and its identifier (m:sender). Then p
i
invokes TAB-broadcast(m).
Let us observe that, when the client is correct, its input  is received by each process. Since there are at least two
correct processes, there will be at least two different processes that will TAB-broadcast the messages m and m0 with
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m:input = m
0
:input = . So, each correct process will TAB-deliver at least two messages containing as input field.
We will say that two messages (TAB-delivered by a given process) match if they have the same input field and
different sender fields.
A central data structure managed by each process p
i
is a local set, namely cmp
i
(Candidate Message Pool), where
p
i
stores the messages it TAB-delivered. This set is managed according to the following rules:
 When a process p
i
TAB-delivers a message m, this message is stored in cmp
i
if there is none, one or two
matching messages already in cmp
i
.
Otherwise, the TAB-delivered message is discarded. This can happen if, for example, cmp
i
has already one
message m0 with m:input = m0:input and m:sender = m0:sender (m does not match m0). It means that
a process (whose identity is m:sender) has issued two TAB-broadcasts with the same client input. In other
words, this process has behaved maliciously.
 When there are exactly two matching messages in cmp
i
, p
i
orders the input (contained in their input field)
without removing the matching messages from cmp
i
.
 When there are exactly three matching messages (note that there cannot be more than three matching messages),
p
i
removes them from cmp
i
and discards them.
So, for each correct p
i
, a message containing input  of a correct client needs to be entered at least twice in its cmp
i
.
Due to the  bound constraint associated with the management of the candidate message pool of each process, nom
can remain in the message pool after TMR time m:ts+. Thus, a crucial point is to ensure that, for each input  from
a correct client, at least two matching messages with the same input field  are simultaneously present in the candi-
date message pools of every correct process. In order this condition can become true, the protocol requires > D+3d.
Finally, each process p
i
has another local data structure OIQ
i
(Ordered Input Queue), where it deposits the input
field of ordered messages. This queue represents the local output of the protocol we are designing. Let us observe
that, due to the TAB-Agreement and TAB-Order properties of the underlying TAB-Broadcast protocol, the ordered
input queues of correct processes will store the same set of inputs in the same order. For example, suppose that
(correct) process p
1
TAB-delivered the following sequence of messages (where m
kx
denotes the kth message with
input 
x
TAB-delivered by p
1
) : m
1a
;m
1b
;m
1c
;m
2c
;m
2a
;m
3c
;m
1d
;m
2b
;m
3b
;m
2d
; : : : The resulting OIQ
1
will
be 
c
; 
a
; 
b
; 
d
; : : :
This discussion is summarized by the formal description of the protocol given in Figure 2. The TMR clock is shared
by the three processes of the TMR subsystem.
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upon the receipt of a valid input  from a client:
(1) (m:input;m:ts;m:sender) (; current value of the TMR clock,i); % make up of m %
(2) TAB-broadcast(m)
end
upon the TAB-delivery of a message m:
(3) let M be the set of messages of cmp
i
with the same input field;
(4) case M = ; then store m in cmp
i
(5) M = fm0g then if (m:sender 6= m0:sender) then m:ts m0:ts;
(6) store m in cmp
i
;
(7) enqueue m:input in OIQ
i
(8) else discard m endif
(9) M = fm0;m00gthen remove m0 and m00 from cmp
i
;
(10) discard m, m0 and m00
(11) endcase
end
Figure 2. Protocol for a Process p
i
4.3 Proof of the Protocol
This section shows that, under the assumption > D++d = D+3d (where = 2d is the timeliness parameter
of the underlying TAB protocol), the protocol described in Figure 2 satisfies the properties defined in Section 3.1 when
it is executed by the processes of a TMR subsystem.
Theorem 1 (AB-Validity). If  > D +, then any input from a correct client is ordered by each correct process of
the TMR subsystem.
Proof Without loss of generality, let us assume that the processes p
1
and p
2
are correct. Let  be an input from a
correct client. In the following, let m
1
(resp. m
2
) denote a message built and TAB-broadcast by p
1
(resp. p
2
) with
 as input field (lines 1-2). Since the client, p
1
and p
2
are correct, m
1
and m
2
do exist. Similarly, let m
3
denote the
message possibly built and TAB-broadcast by p
3
(since p
3
can be faulty, we can assume neither the existence of m
3
nor its TAB-broadcast by p
3
). Let t
1
= m
1
:ts and t
2
= m
2
:ts be the values of the TMR clock when p
1
and p
2
have
built and TAB-broadcast m
1
and m
2
, respectively (lines 1-2). Note that m
1
:input = m
2
:input = . Without loss of
generality, let us assume that t
1
 t
2
. Due to the CASD-Del Time property of the underlying TAB-broadcast protocol
(see Section 4.1), m
1
is TAB-delivered before m
2
at each correct process.
Let t
1
+ 
1
(0  
1
 ) be the time at which p
1
TAB-delivers m
1
; similarly, let t
2
+ 
2
(0  
2
 ) be the
time at which p
1
TAB-delivers m
2
(note that, due to the TAB-Agreement and TAB-Validity properties, these TAB-
deliveries do occur). Moreover,m
1
will be removed from cmp
1
at a time not later than t
1
+
1
+. From the definition
of D (t
2
 t
1
+D), we get:
t
2
+ 
2
 t
1
+D + 
2
 t
1
+D + < t
1
+  t
1
+ 
1
+:
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Thus, when p
1
TAB-delivers m
2
, there are two cases:
 Case 1: m
1
is still stored in cmp
1
. So, m
1
matches with m
2
. If, at that time, cmp
1
contains also m
3
and m
3
matches with m
1
, it means that  has been previously ordered by p
1
(when it stored the two matching messages
m
1
and m
3
). Otherwise, the only message in cmp
1
matching with m
2
is m
1
, and thus p
1
orders  (line 7).
 Case 2: m
1
has already been removed from cmp
1
. But m
1
can be removed from cmp
1
only if there are three
matching messages (line 9) or the TMR clock reaches the value m
1
:ts+.
– The first possibility is excluded (as we consider the case where m
2
is just TAB-delivered by p
1
, there
cannot be three messages matching m
1
).
– The second possibility implies that m
1
:ts +  < t
2
+ 
2
. Since t
2
+ 
2
< t
1
+ 
1
+ , we have
m
1
:ts 6= t
1
. Thus, m
1
:ts has been assigned a new value. This can occur only if line 5 is executed, and
thus m
1
:input =  has been enqueued in OIQ
1
(4).
Hence, in all cases, p
1
orders . A similar reasoning shows that p
2
also orders . 2
Theorem 1
In order to prove AB-Integrity, we first establish a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 1 Let us assume  > D +  + d. Let  be an input from a client and m be a message TAB-broadcast by
a process p
j
with m:input = . After TMR clock time m:ts + , no correct process p
i
that TAB-delivered m will
TAB-deliver a message m0 such that m0:input =  and m0:sender is a correct process.
Proof Let p
j
receive  directly from the client. p
j
builds m with m:input =  and a timestamp m:ts and then
TAB-broadcasts m. There are two cases:
1. The process p
j
is correct. In that case, m:ts is the TMR clock value when p
j
received  directly from the client.
By assumption, p
i
TAB-delivers the message m; this occurs before the TMR time m:ts +  (TAB-timeliness
property). Since  > D++ d > , p
i
does not TAB-deliver m after TMR clock time m:ts+. Moreover,
due to the definition of D, every correct process that receives  directly does so by the TMR time m:ts + D,
builds m0 with m0:input =  and m0:ts  m:ts+D and then TAB-broadcasts m0. Thus, p
i
TAB-delivers m0
no later than TMR time m:ts +D +. Since  > D + + d > D +, p
i
does not TAB-deliver m0 after
TMR clock time m:ts+.
2. The process p
j
is faulty. In that case, it can give an incorrect timestamp m:ts before TAB-broadcasting m. As
in the previous case, p
i
TAB-delivers m before the TMR clock time m:ts + (TAB-timeliness property) and
thus not after the TMR clock time m:ts+. Let t denote the TMR clock time when p
j
received  directly from
the client. The actual transfer delay of m from p
j
to p
i
ranges from 0 to d. Consequently, m arrives at p
i
at
TMR clock time t0 ranging from t to t + d. When m arrives at p
i
, the TAB protocol checks that t0  m:ts+ d
4This case corresponds to the following scenario. The process p
1
TAB-delivered m
3
and stored it into cmp
1
before m
1
. Moreover, when p
1
TAB-delivered m
1
, this message m
1
matched m
3
. So, m
1
has been stored in cmp
1
(line 6), its m:ts field has been reset to the value of m
3
:ts
(line 5), and m
3
:ts+ < t
2
+ 
2
.
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(if this condition is not met, the TAB protocol discards this message because it violates the definition of d and
thus m is not TAB-delivered). From t0  t we have t  t0  m:ts + d. Moreover, due to the definition of D,
every correct process that receives  directly does so by the TMR clock time t+D  m:ts+ d+D, builds m0
with m0:input =  and m0:ts  m:ts+ d+D and TAB-broadcasts m0. Thus p
i
TAB-delivers m0 no later than
TMR clock time m:ts + d +D + . Since  > D +  + d, p
i
does not TAB-delivers m0 after TMR clock
time m:ts+.
2
Lemma 1
Theorem 2 (AB-Integrity). Any input ordered by a correct process comes from a client. Moreover, if additionally
 > D ++ d, any input  is ordered at most once by a correct process.
Proof Let us first consider the first part of the theorem. Say, a correct process p
i
orders an input at line 7. It means
that p
i
has TAB-delivered at least two messages m and m0 having the same input field  and different sender fields
(lines 3 and 5). So, m and m0 have been TAB-broadcast by two distinct processes. By assumption at least one of them
is correct, and has received the input  directly from a client and verified it to be valid.
Let us now consider the second part of the theorem. As in the proof of Theorem 1, let us assume that p
1
and p
2
are
correct processes of the TMR subsystem. Let  be an input that p
1
has ordered once. Let m and m0 the two matching
messages stored in cmp
1
when p
1
has enqueued  in OIQ
1
at some time t (line 7). We have m:ts = m0:ts (line 5).
So, these two messages will be removed from cmp
1
either when a third matching message m00 is TAB-delivered by
p
1
before time m:ts+, or both at time m:ts+.
 Case 1. p
1
TAB-delivered the third matching message m00 before time m:ts + , and discarded m, m0 and
m
00 upon TAB-delivering m00. As (1) a correct process TAB-broadcasts a message for a given  at most once,
and (2) at least two processes are correct, it follows that p
1
cannot TAB-delivers two more matching messages
whose input field is .
So, p
1
will never TAB-deliver a message m
1
such that m
1
:input =  and m
1
:sender is a correct process, after
it has discarded m, m0 and m00.
 Case 2. p
1
has discarded m and m0 at time m:ts+. By Lemma 1, p
1
will not TAB-deliver a message m
1
such
that m
1
:input =  and m
1
:sender is a correct process, after time m:ts+.
For p
1
to order  the second time, at least two matching messages for  need to be simultaneously present again in
cmp
1
. Since there is at most one faulty process, this is not possible.
A similar reasoning shows that p
2
cannot put a given input more than once in OIQ
2
.
2
Theorem 2
Theorem 3 (AB-Agreement). If an input  is ordered by a correct process, then it is ordered by each correct process.
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Proof Let p
i
be a correct process that ordered the input . We conclude from the protocol text, that it TAB-delivered
a sequence of messages including two messages m and m0 such that m:input = m0:input = . Let p
j
be another
correct process. Due to the TAB-Agreement property, p
j
has also TAB-delivered the same messages as p
i
, and due
to the TAB-Order property, in the same order. Due to Lemma 1, these two messages have co-existed in p
j
’s local
memory. It follows that if the sequence of deliveries allowed p
i
to order the input , then the same sequence allows p
j
to order . 2
Theorem 3
Theorem 4 (AB-Order). For any pair of inputs 
1
and 
2
, if a correct process of the TMR subsystem orders 
1
before 
2
, then any correct process of the TMR subsystem orders them in the same way.
Proof Suppose that p
1
and p
2
are two correct processes, and that both order 
1
and 
2
, and p
1
orders 
1
before 
2
.
Since p
1
orders 
1
(line 7), it has TAB-delivered two messages m
1
and m0
1
(in that order) and ordered 
1
at the time it
has TAB-deliveredm0
1
. Since p
1
orders 
2
, it has TAB-delivered two messages m
2
and m0
2
(in that order) and ordered

2
at the time it has TAB-delivered m0
2
. As by assumption p
1
is correct and orders 
1
before 
2
, we conclude that
it TAB-delivered m0
1
before m0
2
. Due to the TAB-Agreement property, p
2
also TAB-delivers the messages m
1
, m
0
1
,
m
2
, m
0
2
; moreover, due to the TAB-Order property, it TAB-delivers them in the same order as p
1
. In particular, it
TAB-delivers m
1
before m0
1
, m
2
before m0
2
and m0
1
before m0
2
. So, p
2
orders 
1
before 
2
. 2
Theorem 4
5 An Impossibility Result
This section shows that, when local verification is performed only on inputs directly received from a client (and
not on every TAB-delivered messages5), there is no -ordering protocol for a TMR subsystem if  < D. First two
lemmas show conditions any -ordering protocol has to satisfy.
5.1 Preliminary Lemmas
The first lemma places a constraint on the forwarding policy of any -ordering protocol. The second lemma places
a constraint on their decision policy.
Lemma 2 Let us consider any -ordering protocol. No (correct) process is allowed to forward an input that does not
directly come from a client.
Proof The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that a -ordering protocol allows processes to forward an input that
does not directly come from a client. Let us consider the case where p
1
behaves incorrectly: it retains an old input
that is already ordered and discarded by correct processes, and sends a copy of it to p
2
and p
3
. If p
2
and p
3
(that
are correct) are to forward the input copy they receive, they will get enough input copies to re-order it, whatever the
decision policy. This violates the AB-Integrity property. 2
Lemma 2
5If input verification is made on every TAB-delivered message, then the scheme suffers all the disadvantages of the first approach mentioned in
the motivation section of the introduction.
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Lemma 3 Let us consider any -ordering protocol. No (correct) process is allowed to order a client input unless
there is a time interval during which this process has at least two copies (from distinct sources) of this input.
Proof The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that the protocol allows a correct process to order an input as soon
as it has a copy of this input. For each possible forwarding policy, we build a scenario that violates the AB-Order
Agreement property.
The three scenarios consider the case where a client C crashes after sending an input to p
1
, but before sending this
input to p
2
and p
3
. There are three cases.
1. Forwarding policy 1: The protocol forces each process that receives an input directly from a client to forward it
to the other two processes.
Let us consider the following scenario where p
1
behaves incorrectly (and thus, by assumption, p
2
and p
3
are
correct) as follows: when p
1
receives the input from C, it forwards it to p
2
but omits to forward it to p
3
. So, p
2
receives one copy of the input and orders it, whereas p
3
, receives no copy, and consequently does not order it.
Hence, this scenario violates the AB-Order Agreement property.
2. Forwarding policy 2: The protocol forces each process that receives an input directly from a client to forward it
to only one other process (e.g., p
1
forwards to p
2
, p
2
to p
3
and p
3
to p
1
).
Let us consider the following scenario in which the three processes behave correctly. Thus, p
1
forwards the
input to p
2
, but not to p
3
: the situation is similar to the previous one and the AB-Order Agreement property is
violated.
3. Forwarding policy 3: The protocol does not allow a process to forward an input.
Assume all processes are correct. In that case, according to the crash of C after it sent its input only to p
1
, it
appears that p
1
will order the input, while p
2
and p
3
will not. Consequently, the AB-Order Agreement property
is violated.
2
Lemma 3
To sum up, it has been shown that for every -ordering protocol, only inputs received directly from clients can be
forwarded (Lemma 2), and no process is allowed to order an input unless it simultaneously has at least two copies
(from different sources) of this input (Lemma 3).
5.2 Impossibility Result
Theorem 5 Let  be an a priori defined constant. There is no -ordering protocol if  < D.
Proof The proof is by contradiction. Let us assume that there is a -ordering protocolP that is correct despite  < D.
We show that P cannot exist. To this aim, it is sufficient to exhibit a scenario consistent with the system and failure
model and with the timing assumptions, and to verify that P is not correct in this scenario.
P uses forwarding delays  (0   < ) ( is the maximal duration that can elapse between the receipt of an
input directly from a client and the forwarding of this input to the other processes). Let us consider the scenario
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p1
T1
p
2
T1+
T1+D + 
T1+T1+
T1++ 
T1+D + + T1+D + 
T1+D
p
2
T1+ T1++ 
T1+D T1+D + 
p
1
T1 T1+ T1+ T1+D +  T1+D + + 
First case :  < D  
Second case : D       
Figure 3. A Scenario Showing P Cannot be a -Ordering Protocol
described in Figure 3 where: C is a correct client; p
1
, p
2
are correct; p
3
is crashed (i.e., stopped functioning). This
is consistent with the failure model. Actual transmission delays between processes is zero (this is consistent with the
timing assumptions).
 C sends an input to p1; p2 and p3.
 p
1
receives the client input at a time T1.
 p
2
receives the client input at time T2 = T1 +D.
Note that, since T2   T1 = D, this scenario is consistent with the timing assumptions. Now, according to the
forwarding policy of the assumed protocol P , we have:
 p
1
forwards the input to p
2
and p
3
at time T1 + .
 p
2
forwards the input to p
1
and p
3
at time T2 + .
Because of the scenario assumption on the actual transmission delays, processes have copies of the client input in the
following time intervals:
 p
1
has
– one copy in [T1; T1+ ] (copy from C),
– one copy in [T1 +D + ; T1 +D + +] (copy from p
2
).
 p
2
has
– one copy in [T1 + ; T1 + +] (copy from p
1
),
– one copy in [T1 +D;T1 +D +] (copy from C).
Let us examine for each correct process (i.e., p
1
and p
2
) whether it meets the requirement of Lemma 3 (which states a
necessary condition to order a client input).
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 For process p
1
, whatever the value of  (0   < ) the two time intervals are disjoint. Actually, we have:
T1 +  < T1 +D (client copy and p
2
’s copy do not intersect)6.
 For process p
2
, there are two cases.
1. if 0   < D    then T1 + + < T1 +D (p
1
’s copy and client copy do not intersect)
2. if D      then during the non-empty interval [T1+D;T1++], p
2
has p
1
’s copy and client’s
copy. (this possible intersection is indicated by a shadowed box on Figure 3).
 The process p
3
does not have to be considered as it is crashed.
Summarizing these results, we conclude that:
1. If 0   < D , none of the correct processes orders C’s input. Hence, the AB-Validity property is violated.
2. If D      < , p
1
does not order the client input, while p
2
does it. The processes p
1
and p
2
being correct,
it follows that the AB-Order Agreement property is violated.
So, this contradicts the assumption that P is a -ordering protocol despite the fact that  < D. 2
Theorem 5
5.3 Prior Estimation of D
Theorem 5 suggests that D must be known a priori for implementing a -order protocol that performs input match-
ing. We have defined D as the maximum delay within which any two server processes that receive a given client
input get delivered of that input by the network. In an e-business environment with a large number of potential clients,
the server replication must be made transparent to clients by employing (redundant) proxies as the communication
front-end to the server; a client will unicast its input to one of the proxies which will then forward the input to each
server replica. (Such a front-end is typically used for load-balancing, see [7].) The functionality of a proxy is thus to
’triplicate and transmit’ what it receives; a proxy does not maintain any application related state information and our
failure model permits it to crash while transmitting a request. Since the proxies are housed in the same administrative
domain as the server replicas, D will be small and can be estimated a priori. We refer the reader to [11] for information
regarding DNS server that can forward a client input to one of the functioning proxies in a round-robin manner.
6 Conclusion
The paper addressed the problem of building a reliable TMR-based server despite the restriction of bounded input
lifetimes (bound ). This problem thus amounts to extending an Atomic Broadcast protocol in a particular setting,
so that spurious inputs forwarded by a faulty process can be discarded in finite time, without any time-consuming
verifications which could slow down node performance. The novelty of this problem comes from the constraints
imposed by the application context where potential clients can be in the order of millions. More precisely, the correct
6The sentence “ a copy c and another copy c0 intersect” means that there is an instant at which the relevant process has both copies in its local
memory.
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processes have to order client inputs in the same way despite the combined effect of the bound , the behavior of
a Byzantine server process, and the client crash failures. Moreover, the system provides two different transfer delay
bounds, one for the difference between network delivery times of the same client input (D) and another for the
communication between correct processes within the TMR server (d).
Two results have been presented. The first one is a new protocol that allows the correct processes of a TMR subsys-
tem to consistently order client inputs, provided that  > D+ 3d. This protocol has two main characteristics. From a
methodological point of view, its design relies on an underlying building block, namely, a protocol solving the Timed
Atomic Broadcast problem in the TMR system. From a practical point of view, the problem solved by the proto-
col encapsulates practical requirements (bounded input lifetimes for efficient memory management) and the protocol
timing assumptions are supported by emerging network technologies. The second result concerns the impossibility in
designing a -ordering protocol when  < D.
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